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Abstract: Background: The scene of a mass-casualty attack (MCA) entails a crime scene, a hazardous
space and a great number of people needing medical assistance. Public transportation has been the
target of such attacks and involves a high probability of generating mass casualties. The aim of the
review was to investigate challenges for on-scene responses to MCAs and suggestions made to counter
these challenges, with special attention given to attacks on public transportation and associated terminals.
Methods: Articles were found through PubMed and Scopus, “relevant articles” as defined by the databases,
and a manual search of references. Inclusion criteria were that the article referred to attack(s) and/or a public
transportation-related incident and issues concerning formal on-scene response. An appraisal of the articles’
scientific quality was conducted based on an evidence hierarchy model developed for the study. Results:
One hundred and five articles were reviewed. Challenges for command and coordination on scene included
establishing leadership, inter-agency collaboration, multiple incident sites, and logistics. Safety issues
entailed knowledge and use of personal protective equipment, risk awareness and expectations, dynamic
risk assessment, cordons, defensive versus offensive approaches, and joining forces. Communication
concerns were equipment shortfalls, dialoguing and providing information. Assessment problems were
scene layout and interpreting environmental indicators as well as understanding setting-driven needs for
specialist skills and resources. Triage and treatment difficulties included differing triage systems, directing
casualties, uncommon injuries, field hospitals, level of care and providing psychological and pediatric
care. Transportation hardships included scene access, distance to hospitals, and distribution of casualties.
Conclusion: Commonly encountered challenges during unintentional incidents were augmented during
MCAs, implying specific issues for safety, assessment, triage, and treatment, which require training.
Effectively increasing readiness for MCAs will likely entail struggles to overcome fragmentation between
the emergency services and the broader crisis management system as well as enabling critical and
prestige-less, context-based assessments, of needed preparatory efforts.
Keywords: antagonism; disaster response; emergency medical services; fire fighter; law enforcement;
mass transportation; mass-casualty incident; rescue work; terrorism
1. Introduction
The scene of an antagonistically induced mass-casualty
incident, also called mass-casualty attack (MCA) [1], entails
a crime scene, a hazardous space, and medical challenge,
demanding a complex response by the police, rescue ser-
vices and emergency medical services (EMS). Countering
the aspects, with overlaying short- and long-term priorities
and differing organizational roles, is key to optimal function-
ing in the response stage of an event. This includes early
c© 2016 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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planning for transfer of response organizations to the scene
of the attack, prevention of disturbances and additional at-
tacks, and prompt and efficient care of the victims [2]. It
also implies a need to take care so that the initial rescue
priorities do not unnecessarily impact long-term priorities,
such as careless handling of bodies which could reduce the
possibility of identification [3]. Response to an MCA thus
creates high demands for all the emergency organizations
to work together, to carry out their own responsibilities, and
achieve the collective goal of limiting the consequences of
the attack. Maximizing effectiveness of event management
constitutes a defensive counter-terrorism measure—which
Perliger and colleagues [2] hold are warranted—instead
of focusing only on active offensive methods, as terrorism
cannot be entirely prevented.
Active shooter or bombing response scenes present
risks of undetonated devices, secondary bombings and
shootings against rescue workers [4–6]. Natural or built
hazards may also be an issue, e.g., if the attack target
is public transportation. This has been the case in some
of the more publicized MCAs during the 21st century, like
the attacks against the railway sector in Madrid in 2004
(191 fatalities/more than 1500 non-fatally injured people)
[7] and on the subway system and a bus in London in
2005 (56 fatalities/775 non-fatally injured people) [8]. Hol-
gersson and Bjo¨rnstig showed that there was a large
increase in non-fatally injured people resulting from the
mass-casualty attacks (≥10 fatally injured and/or ≥100
non-fatally injured) on public transportation during the
years 2000–2009 compared to the previous three decades
of the study period. Simultaneously, attacks against termi-
nal buildings, multiple targets, and using complex tactical
approaches increased during that decade [1]. This may
imply that preparedness among contemporary emergency
organizations needs to include the ability to manage large
numbers of injured people, possibly at multiple locations,
including confined or collapsed spaces, in a hostile and
hazardous environment.
Few health care providers have any experience in true
mass-casualty incidents with the imbalance between the
immediate medical need of a large number of victims and
local medical resources [9]. Furthermore, civilian terror-
ist bombings represent unique challenges to the trauma
system, e.g., they often include an urban setting, security
and field triage challenges, distinctive injury patterns, and a
rapid transfer and distribution of casualties to appropriate
hospitals [6]. Victims of terrorist attacks may also present
a combination of blast, blunt, penetrating and burn injuries.
Blast injuries may be particularly challenging to diagnose
and manage, as they may initially may be occult, with no
visible signs of injury [10–15]. The setting of modern urban
terrorist bombings also means that civilian medical systems
are confronted with patients arriving at the hospital alive
who would likely have died of their injuries in previous con-
ventional war settings [6]. Moreover, there is a difference
in those at risk of injury in a military setting versus those in
a civilian setting, where the civilian environment includes
children and the elderly [16–19]. Antagonistic acts thus
result in injuries that are not commonly encountered in the
civilian environment and also augment the challenges of
an unintentional mass-casualty incident by adding the fac-
tor of a hostile environment which together, demand other
approaches by the responders on scene. In-depth studies
of previous responses are one way to enable preparation
of a more effective emergency response in the immediate
aftermath of an attack [9,20].
The aim of the review was to analyze research on
challenges for on-scene responses to mass-casualty at-
tacks and suggestions made to counter these challenges,
with special attention given to attacks on public trans-
portation and associated terminals. The discussion con-
siders how overarching findings can be used in efforts to
increase preparedness.
2. Methods and Materials
This integrative literature review set out to generate new
knowledge about responses to attacks through review, cri-
tique and synthesis of representative literature in an inte-
grated manner [21]. Searches of the databases PubMed
and Scopus, as well as references from extracted articles,
were conducted in order to limit the risk of systematic er-
rors. Previous studies have indicated that one database
search is not enough to find all the studies that have the
potential to answer a research question [22]. Searches
were conducted in MEDLINE (PubMed) and Scopus in July
2014, and again in May 2015, for articles about on-scene
response to terrorist attacks (all published between 1970
and 2015 in the English language). In PubMed, several test
searches—with different MeSH-terms, free text words, and
filters—were conducted in order to find a balance between a
too-narrow and a too-broad search [22]. Components iden-
tified as search clusters in order to find articles of interest
were: intentionality (weapons, explosions and terrorism),
target (transportation), and consequence and management
(wounds and injuries, disasters, emergency responders
and emergency medical services). All words were used
as MeSH-terms except for “terrorism” and “transportation”,
which were also used as “free text keywords”: these terms
led to the identification of relevant articles while simply hav-
ing them as MeSH terms meant erroneous exclusion of
relevant articles. One word from each cluster needed to
be present for the article to be found in the search. A simi-
lar search was conducted in Scopus thereafter in order to
find more articles related to the police and rescue services,
complementing the medical perspective more prominent in
PubMed. Slightly different keywords and clusters were used
as MeSH terms could not be used in Scopus and the aim
was to identify more articles regarding the police and rescue
service (Table 1). For each title selected, additional titles of
interest were also found through the box “related citations
in PubMed” or the box “related documents” in Scopus.
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Table 1. Database searches.
Database Search strings
PubMed ((“Explosions”[mesh] OR “Terrorism”[mesh] OR “Terrorism”[All Fields] OR “Weapons”[mesh]) AND (“Transportation”[mesh] OR
“Transportation”[All Fields]) AND (“Disasters”[mesh] OR “Wounds and Injuries”[mesh] OR “Emergency Responders”[mesh] OR
“Emergency Medical Services”[mesh])) AND “English”[Filter]
Scopus TITLE-ABS-KEY(“mass casualty event*” OR “mass casualty incident*” OR “mass violence” OR terrorism OR bomb*) AND
(“rescue work” OR “emergency responder*” OR “first responder*” OR “law enforcement” OR police OR “fire fighter*”) AND
(emergency* AND (response OR care OR management)) AND ( LIMIT-TO(LANGUAGE, “English” ) ) AND ( EXCLUDE (
DOCTYPE , “bk” ) OR EXCLUDE ( DOCTYPE , “ch” ) )
Articles of interest were reviewed in a staged manner:
firstly, through readings of their titles; secondly, the chosen
abstracts and then the full texts were examined to confirm
that they did not meet the exclusion criteria, but met the
inclusion criteria:
Inclusion criteria
(1a) attack(s);
• Specified attack or compounded analysis from
several attacks
• Actual attacks/incidents as opposed to simula-
tions or theoretical models
• Irrespective of number of casualties, as long
as they were enough to trigger a formal civilian
mass-casualty response in the society in which
they occurred
AND/OR
(1b) public-transportation-related incident;
• Attacks in connection to public transportation
and unintentional incidents with similar injury
mechanisms, i.e., explosions and fires
AND
(2) which raised issues of concern for formal on-scene
response
• As stated in the MIMMS framework (Hodgetts &
Mackway-Jones 1995; 2004; see below)
Exclusion criteria
(1) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) attacks
(2) Exposure to “World Trade Center air pollutants”
(3) Long-term psychological and physical sequelae for
victims or responders
(4) Management and identification of human remains
(5) Ethical considerations during and after incident man-
agement
To determine inclusion or exclusion of articles, relevance
to the aim was deemed to weigh more than strict scientific
standards and methodology. The reference lists of the se-
lected abstracts were searched for further relevant articles
based on titles, and those articles were read in full. Lastly,
the final selection of articles was made, further excluding
those texts that after scrutiny failed to meet inclusion criteria
2, i.e. did not contain detailed descriptions of challenges
during civilian incident management. This inclusion criteria
also meant that reports of incident management without
formal prehospital response were excluded, which implies
inclusion of articles mainly from OECD countries. The find-
ings are therefore applicable primarily in such contexts.
To assess the scientific quality of each included arti-
cle, an adapted model of evidence hierarchy was created
(including study designs; Figure 1), based on evidence
ratings and descriptions of study design from the medi-
cal field [22–24]. However, research regarding disasters,
crises, or mass-casualty incidents is not limited to health
and medical science fields. The subject also presents
intrinsic research challenges and is not an area that can
be approached through experimental studies such as
randomized-controlled trials (RCT). This does not imply
that it cannot be the subject of rigorous research, but
rather necessitates an adapted evidence hierarchy model
that includes the types of studies involved in this multi-
disciplinary research field. The study design and method
by which the research is carried out and presented, con-
stitute integral parts to the assessment of a study’s quality.
Different study designs are suitable depending on the re-
search question, but certain study designs are generally
allotted higher evidence value, illustrated by schematic
pyramids of evidence hierarchy where the studies higher
up the pyramid are assigned higher evidence value, given
that they are properly conducted and described [22,23].
Meta-analyses and RCTs were excluded in the adapted
model, as there were no such studies included in the re-
view, while systematic reviews and cross-sectional studies
were considered a basis for high-quality evidence. The
articles constituting medium evidence-based studies were
the “retrospective case series” (a research design nor-
mally seen in the medical field), the “comparative case
studies” (a research design used within the political sci-
ence field), and “case studies”. Lastly, non-systematic re-
views, guidelines, special reports, consensus statements,
and perspective articles were considered to have lower
evidence value, mainly due to lacking or no presentation
of aim, methods or references in these articles.
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Figure 1. Evidence hierarchy, for scientific quality assessment, including study design description. (E.g. This review
would fit with the description of a “systematic review”, due to its systematic and appraising nature and the ambition to
synthesize existing research on MCA management).
The internationally used Major Incident Medical Manage-
ment and Support (MIMMS) framework, a systematic, peda-
gogic model of command and management at the scene of
an incident [25,26], constituted the baseline for extraction and
sorting the results. This was chosen as it includes details that
concern the study’s target population of the police, rescue
service, and ambulance staff, and it has a medical focus that
corresponded well with the findings of the literature search.
The defined management priorities Command, Safety, Com-
munication, Assessment, Triage, Treatment, and Transport,
used in MIMMS, constituted the basis for extraction of infor-
mation, word-for-word, from the articles. Command entailed
issues concerning vertical and horizontal leadership of the
overall rescue effort on scene and re-occurring management
challenges. Safety included issues regarding the safety of
personnel, the scene, and the survivors, with hazards de-
noting an unintentional safety risk and threat denoting an
intentional one. Communication involved issues with trans-
mission of information within and between personnel in the
emergency organizations on scene, and along the chain of
command, as well as to supporting organizations and facil-
ities and other persons requiring information. Assessment
included issues of interest for the ambulance service in or-
der to make estimates of the number of injured, severity of
injuries, and needs for extra resources and expertise; in this
case involving incident scene overview, the influence of the
surrounding public transportation environment on injuries,
and the work environment. Triage and Treatment comprised
issues regarding the prioritization of injured people for medi-
cal care and evacuation; as well as the type of injuries after
attacks, level of care, and treatment on scene, and the people
who provide care. Transport included issues of accessing,
evacuating, and distributing injured people to appropriate
medical facilities. After the relevant information was catego-
rized, the information was compounded into its core elements
and synthesized in subcategories.
3. Results
The primary and related article searches yielded 300 titles
of interest out of the 1,638 unique articles found in the
database searches, as well as 65 “related article” titles
and “reference article” titles. Further review of abstracts
found that 116 articles appeared relevant to the study,
and 105 articles were included in the review after full-text
readings (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Study flow from identification through screening of relevance and quality.
Of the studies included, three constituted systematic re-
views about blast injuries and safety issues, and three articles
were cross-sectional studies (i.e., six high-quality studies).
Fourteen of the reviewed articles were retrospective case
series/comparative case studies and 46 were case studies
(i.e., 60 medium-quality studies). Fifteen non-systematic re-
views and guidelines, ten special reports, two consensus
statements, and 12 perspective articles were identified in the
lower part of the evidence hierarchy model (i.e., 39 low-quality
studies). Table 2 summarizes the findings of the review re-
garding the management issues described in the articles,
sorted according to MIMMS main management tasks.
3.1. Command and Coordination
Traditionally, the first management task is often labeled
“command and control”, but the articles included in the re-
view clearly portray the essential aspects of coordination,
which is why the labeling of this section also reflects this.
3.1.1. Establishing a Clear, Unified Scene Leadership
Lack of command, coordination, and integration between
the emergency organizations have been commonly reported
problems during responses to MCAs [2,27–30]. The pres-
ence of several representatives of similar emergency organi-
zations and several responders in a leadership position have
also amounted to confusion, contradictory orders, and compli-
cations for scene management [30,31]. Early establishment
of a common operating picture with all involved agencies gath-
ered in a multidisciplinary, unified command at an Incident
Command Post (ICP), has been critical for the synchroniza-
tion and effectiveness of rescue operations [4,5,14,32,33].
According to Perliger et al. [2], a clear picture of the situa-
tion and proper coordination during the first minutes after an
attack had a greater effect on the duration of the on-scene
management process than the number of medical staff or the
number of wounded people. Increased standardization of the
command structures, language to manage events, and clear
jurisdictions and distribution of duties between the involved
emergency organizations, could increase survival [29,30,34].
3.1.2. Collaborating across Responder Professions in
Planning & Practice
Inter-agency planning and coordination is regarded
as imperative between police, rescue service, emer-
gency medical services, and mental health profession-
als [2,5,20,29,35,36]. Pre-event collaboration plans may
also need to include policies for cross-border medical
responses [37] and use of military units [37] or specific
sea rescue organizations [35]. Priorities on the incident
site should not be viewed as sequential. Instead, sev-
eral actions need to occur simultaneously, carried out by
different rescue organizations [5,29,34]. This necessi-
tates functional inter-agency collaboration with clearly pre-
determined, common principles for incident management
and defined tasks and responsibilities of each organization,
which in turn need to be drilled [2,5,34,38]. If responders
are not aware of the others’ identities, roles, or tasks, prob-
lems in the inter-agency cooperation will likely arise [38].
Intra- and inter-agency cooperation and coordination is
required for efficient management, but such cooperation is
complicated as a large number of teams assemble, each
with its own goals, its own organizational terminology, and
its own supervision [2,7,39,40].
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Table 2. Summary of defined challenges and corresponding scientific quality of articles.
Prioritized task Management challenges Quality appraisal of articles referenced
Low Medium High
Command & Coordination • Establishing a clear, unified scene leadership 7 5
• Collaborating across responder professions in planning & practice 6 7
• Coordinating multi-site incidents & multi-exit scenes 2 5
• Balancing needs for staff & resources 2 5
Safety • Knowing of & using personal protective equipment 6 3
• Being aware of risks & having realistic expectations of safety 7 4 1
• Conducting dynamic risk assessments & cordoning off the scene 7 7
• Approaching safety defensively or offensively 5 1
• Joining forces 3
Communication • Functioning equipment - overload, destruction, & incompatibility 10 12
• Dialoguing - content, language & relay 5 10
• Informing - survivors, relatives & the public 4 8
Assessment • Viewing scene layout &interpreting environmental indicators 9 11 2
• Understanding setting-driven needs for specialist skills & resources 9 8
Triage & Treatment • Differing triage systems & labelling 3 12
• Directing & gathering casualties 6 7
• Encountering uncommon injuries 15 26 5
• Setting up field hospitals & personnel matters 17 14
• Determining ambition for level of care & treatment 10 6 1
• Providing psychological support 7 3
• Caring for the pediatric casualty 1 2
Transport • Accessing & leaving the scene 8 10
• Evacuating from urban or rural scenes 5 11
• Distributing patients 14 18
3.1.3. Coordinating Multi-Site Incidents & Multi-Exit
Scenes
Challenges with coordination have been most commonly
seen at events where there has been several incident sites or
more than one evacuation point [2,41]. When several attacks
have occurred simultaneously and in geographically proximal
areas, there has been confusion regarding the number of
incidents [20,30]. This confusion leads to misunderstandings
at EMS dispatch about the location of the scenes, resulting
in severe maldistribution of medical assets and personnel,
and greatly varying levels of treatment [30]. In order to avoid
such issues, a functional central command level is essential,
as multiple incidents often aggravate communication and
coordination problems [20]. Multi-site incidents may also
increase coordination demands due to occurrence within a
catchment area of several EMS systems or jurisdiction of sev-
eral involved agencies [41,42]. Another problem for incident
command may occur if there are multiple exits available from
the site, e.g. incidents in tunnels, on ferries or islands, as
casualties can escape in several directions. This can result
in dispersal of responders and can complicate organization
of clearing stations and evacuation, but management may be
alleviated by setting up several command posts [41,43,44].
3.1.4. Balancing Needs for Staff & Resources
A study by Juffermans and Bierens [38] indicated that lo-
gistics was an issue at all five incident sites researched,
often connected to communication deficiencies. Timely and
adequate supply of clothing, tools, and equipment is im-
portant, e.g., for identification, safety, debris removal, and
void searches [14,45]. While the definition of mass-casualty
incident commonly implies dealing with resource shortage
supplying an excess of resources and personnel may lead
to difficulties in tracking and locating supplies, problems
with coordinating the rescue effort and may delay casualty
evacuation [2,33,39,46].
3.2. Safety
The principle priority at the scene of an attack is safety of
self, scene and survivors [6,14,25,47]. Rescue personnel
have to face a reality where there is a need to worry about
their own and the victims’ safety, as well as demands to
manage life-threatening injuries [6]. According to Kashuk et
al. [6], balancing such safety concerns with expeditious ca-
sualty care requires training, in addition to a well-developed
work ethics base and, optimally, actual experience.
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3.2.1. Knowing of & Using Personal Protective Equipment
To be able to work on site, all rescue personnel need to be
familiar with personal protective equipment (PPE; e.g., hel-
met and respiratory protection), and the equipment needs
to be immediately available in the response vehicles [43,45].
Respiratory protection, for example, is not just applicable
to minimize inhalation of intentional chemical or biological
agents, but also airborne particles present after bombings
or after a building collapse [43]. Lack of PPE use by re-
sponders has been seen during previous responses, with
several accounts of on- and off-duty staff working on scenes
wearing scrubs, surgical masks, and clogs [28,44,48–50].
Responders from involved emergency organizations may
not be equally aware of the risks to themselves during shoot-
ing incidents or of the limitations of their protective gear.
Military rounds, e.g., those used in high-velocity weapons,
can easily penetrate the sides of a vehicle as well as some
bullet-resistant vests [4]. Thus, while they may stop bul-
lets from some guns, it is important not to assume that
“bullet-resistant vests” are “bulletproof vests” [4,51].
3.2.2. Being Aware of Risks & Having Realistic
Expectations of Safety
Caution is warranted during scene approach, as initial re-
ports may have given the wrong location, and thus rescue
personnel may place themselves and their vehicles at risk
of unintentional hazard or an intentional threat [4,52]. Fol-
lowing an attack, responders need to consider the risk of
secondary explosions or coordinated attacks [20], as at-
tacks are sometimes arranged to create a need for a rescue
effort through an action, to then target rescue personnel
on arrival [4,7,9,33]. Several case studies however, tell of
lapses in determining presence or absence of secondary
explosives [30,44], and undetonated devices have been
present at several attack sites [30,44], implying that per-
sonnel have provided treatment and placed casualty tents
within the risk zone of undetonated devices [7,30]. In one
case, the police collecting belongings unknowingly brought
an undetonated device to the police station [7,30]. As op-
posed to responses revealing a lack of risk awareness,
exercises have also revealed unrealistic expectations of
safety at hostile event scenes by EMS and fire services.
The difficult and time-consuming practice of waiting for a
full risk assessment could delay provision of life-saving care
[53]. Thus, it is not always possible to secure the entire site
quickly enough to refrain from continuing the rescue effort.
Responses to MCAs may require a transition into thinking
of “relative safety” and “plus one” threat (e.g., looking for
secondary devices or a perpetrator among the victims)—a
frame of thought implying wariness of safety threats without
expecting the entire scene to be secured before acting [5].
In a systematic review, Thompson et al. further showed that
while the scene of a terrorist attack includes direct threats,
the published literature suggests that dominant causes of
mortality and morbidity in responders after such incidents
have been due to indirect environmental hazards [54].
3.2.3. Conducting Dynamic Risk Assessments &
Cordoning off the Scene
Scene safety includes assessing and ensuring the immedi-
ate safety of the incident scene from both present threats
and potential hazards, which need to be continuously re-
evaluated by way of a dynamic risk assessment as the
rescue and tactical situation may change [40,43,48]. If
there are no set policy decisions regarding whether to go
in or wait, i.e. “rules of engagement”, the decision ought
to be made by someone with management responsibility
and not left to individual responders [43,53]. During MCA
responses, there is a need to move people away from the
scene [8,20], i.e., evacuate casualties, distance civilians,
perform crowd control [34], and control access by checking
personnel identification [9]. A suitable division of a scene
may be one with three cordons, similar to those used in
the UK [20]. In a schematic representation (Figure 3), the
“middle cordon” could be an established safe area, func-
tioning as a buffer area, allowing for triage and life-saving
treatment of casualties outside of the immediate danger
area found in the “inner circle”. The “outer circle” would
then contain the designated evacuation roads, identifica-
tion control, and searched buildings. The police’s ability
to create and regulate the cordons is an essential task for
alleviating management and provision of important medi-
cal procedures and hindering follow-up attacks [20,33,46].
Cordons also constitute an important measure to protect
forensic evidence and control the flow of personnel and
traffic [14], but they need to operate while minimizing bar-
riers for essential equipment, staff, and patients [2,42,55],
through pre-determined plans and functional inter-agency
cooperation [2].
3.2.4. Approaching Safety Defensively or Offensively
Approaches to scene safety and management on scene
differ throughout the world, depending on the local con-
text, governance, and experiences of attacks. Based on
conflict experiences in Colombia, responders do not en-
ter a scene without governmental provision of troops in
order to assure security [20]. Experience with follow-up
attacks in Israel has led to the enactment of different regu-
lations at different times [32,33]. At one point, regulations
forbade medical forces from entering the scene until the
police had given the all-clear, but these were not strictly ad-
hered to, and opposite policies have also been described
where EMS do not wait for security clearance [33]. Instead,
wearing their mandatory protective gear, they attempt to
remove casualties from the immediate vicinity of the initial
event, only providing external hemorrhage control before
doing so [32]. The first example describes a more de-
fensive approach to safety while the latter tells of a more
offensive approach. The offensive approach implies an
aggressive entry into an unsecured scene containing casu-
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alties, followed by rapidly addressing correctable trauma
and promptly evacuating victims in a joint entry involving
police and medical personnel [5]. The 1999 Columbine
school shooting constituted a watershed incident in the
development of the more offensive approach, leading the
police to adopt an “active shooter” tactic. During similar
incidents, the tactic implies that police rush into the build-
ing and attempt to end the threat instead of awaiting the
Special Weapons and Tactical (SWAT) team. At the time
of the Columbine shooting, the previous tactic led to some
of the fatalities and morbidity among casualties due to
unchecked hemorrhage and chock, as a result of delay in
threat neutralization and care. Use of the changed tactic
has allowed tactical medics to provide care before entire
scene safety clearance [29,58]. The change in tactics have
also resulted from experiences of combat trauma, which
can amount to similar injury patterns as those in active
shooter incidents and terrorist attacks. Thus, the prehospi-
tal guidelines of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC),
customized for use on the battlefield to avoid common
causes of preventable death in combat, have increasingly
gained acceptance in the civilian trauma care system and
the principles have been adapted into different training
programs for care during civilian tactical situations [29].
Figure 3. Schematic summary figure of response on the scene of antagonistic attacks, depicting zones of action and
essential tasks by personnel of the responder forces (adapted from Almogy & Rivkind 2007 [34], Jacobs et al. 2014 [29];
Autrey et al. 2014 [5]).
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3.2.5. Joining Forces
Traditionally, the responsibilities and responses of the
emergency organizations to MCAs have been viewed as
separate actions conducted sequentially. However, death
due to exsanguination from a proximal extremity vascular
disruption can occur in as little as 4-5 minutes, implying
that the typical sequential response of law enforcement
followed by EMS and rescue services cannot happen fast
enough to avoid preventable death [29,56]. The resultant
need for an integrated response of the emergency organi-
zations increases inter-agency dependence and requires
joint training as well as raised awareness in risk assess-
ment. This is to enable an adaptable response to the situ-
ation in terms of safety risks and the need to provide care
[5]. Autrey et al. [5] described an approach that guides the
initial 30 minutes of a response to a blast or active shooter
event, which can be remembered through the mnemonic
“3 Echo”, representing “Enter”, “Evaluate”, and “Evacuate”.
In an effort to deal with the dilemma of responder safety
(entering a scene too early) versus delayed care to vic-
tims (entering a scene too late), the approach presents
the use of “evacuation corridors” to gain access to victims
by initially securing functional areas instead of the entire
site [5]. In accordance with the 3 Echo principles, during
a mass-shooting police immediately entered the building
to contain and neutralize the threat. Simultaneously, loca-
tions of casualties were identified and communicated to
incident command. Additional arriving support began to
create cover, establish cordons, create command, staging
areas, and coordinate medical asset deployment. Next, a
secondary group of police officers gained access to iden-
tified casualties and secured the immediate area where
they were located, rapidly identified viable victims, devel-
oped an evacuation corridor from a safe point of entry,
and called in EMS from the staging area. EMS personnel
then entered the secured corridor under police escort, and
injured casualties were rapidly body swept for weapons
and immediately treated with tourniquets if needed. Then,
they were evacuated along the corridor to safe staging
before being rapidly transported to a suitable health care
facility. Police security screened the walking wounded as
they were guided out of the hazard area to assembly areas
for treatment on scene or medical transportation [5].
3.3. Communication
The key to a successful response is effective communica-
tion [57], but communication problems have been reported
as one of the most common, and most serious, challenges
in MCAs [2,9,20,31,35,38,39,44,46,58–60].
3.3.1. Functioning Equipment—Overload, Destruction, &
Incompatibility
One of the most frequent problems with communication is
technical inadequacy, shown by overload of landline tele-
phones, mobile networks, and radio-channels on walkie-
talkies [7,20,28,30,31,39,42,44,46,53,61–65]. Equipment
failure has also been caused by actual physical damage to
the communication infrastructure [40,64,68]. Incompatible
equipment and separate coordination centers between in-
volved emergency organizations and between civilian and
military actors have likewise caused communication and
cooperation problems [30,65]. Consequences of equip-
ment breakdown include inability to call in more staff or
resources, failure to keep track of units on scene or in-
form them of safety issues, or prompting staff to drive to
the scenes without knowing where to respond and stage
[39,42,62,66]. To overcome communication shortfalls on
scene, hand-held megaphones, runners, and hand signals
can be used, but hand signals would require clear visibility
and prior training [20,32,35,42]. Two-way radios with dedi-
cated channels have often provided a good communication
alternative, but it can be impeded in some locations, such
as the subway, near crash sites, and in buildings [6,44,67].
Other communication solutions seen have been cellphone
providers donating phones and activating reserve system
capacity [46] or an alternative system for emergency com-
munication only [62]. For maximum effectiveness, schemes
of access overload control need to be pre-arranged [57].
The procedure could also permit the police to block cell
phone frequencies in certain areas to prevent potential acti-
vation of secondary devices, without leaving units on scene
deprived of means of communication [30].
3.3.2. Dialoguing—Content, Language, & Relay
While functional equipment is a prerequisite for functional
communication, communication breakdown might still occur
due to failure in the process of exchange of information, e.g.
due to absence of training, poor compliance with basic prin-
ciples for communication or lack of routine procedures for
relaying information [2,33,38]. Functional communication
between and within organizations is important [2] and may
be eased through use of a common lexicon to avoid differ-
ent interpretations of terms used [20]. Language barriers
between the responders and casualties as well as tempo-
rary deafness of bombing victims have constituted other
communication difficulties [20,35,68,69]. Problems with re-
laying information between responder units have coincided
with large incident scenes and units divided into sub-zones
[70]. Information relay has also been problematic due to
noise levels, e.g. by helicopters with rotors [35] and heavy
machinery [48]. Information relay between the incident
site, EMS, and the emergency department (ED) have been
lacking repeatedly, e.g. regarding the size and complexity
of the incident [8,20,28,30,53,71]. Transmitting and docu-
menting detailed information about the patients constitutes
another challenge during MCAs as initial triage, treatment,
and transfer is often conducted by different responders, with
little or no contact among them. This means essential pa-
tient data and valuable time is lost repeatedly throughout
the caregiving process [30]. Several researchers therefore
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stress the need for documentation and information transfer,
e.g., through easy-to-read triage tags [30,66].
3.3.3. Informing—Survivors, Relatives & the Public
Communication does not only need to function between
people involved in the rescue effort, information also needs
to reach survivors, relatives, and the general public. Keep-
ing relatives and victims informed may prevent problems
post-trauma [62]. Moreover, clear communication with the
public, providing simple information, directions, and ad-
vice regarding what has happened and what to do, may
calm fears, discourage people from assembling at hospi-
tals and incident scenes, and lessen calls to emergency
dispatch [20,28,39]. Setting up a transfer procedure or hot-
line for “incident-related calls” may alleviate pressure from
the dispatch center [20,63]. Arranging a temporary Crisis
Information Center or Family Assistance Center, staffed by
psychologists, nurses, and social workers, have been other
examples of aids to help identify and locate victims and re-
trieve information regarding their condition or liaise between
other supportive services [67,72,73]. A method for dealing
with the media ought to be included in emergency plans
[46]; previous incidents have shown that if information and
clear directions are not given, there may be dissemination
of misinformation, hospital referral numbers, or unautho-
rized calls for volunteers [48,61,65]. While the media have
been known to contribute to collapses in communication,
there have also been examples where television and radio
channels have worked as a means of mobilizing staff [62].
3.4. Assessment
All involved organizations make their own assessments
of the scene reflecting their responsibilities and exper-
tise, but this section focuses on the EMS organization
in accordance with the reviewed articles. In order to
enable an organized response, one person on the first
medical team on scene is appointed “medic in charge”
or “medical incident commander” (MIC). The role implies
focus on facilitating the EMS chain of command by being
the eyes and ears “on the ground” and transferring this
information to EMS central command. This assessment
process is started by refraining from rendering medical
help, concentrating instead on a rapid scene assess-
ment and communicating to EMS central command: (1)
the Exact location of the scene; (2) Type of event; (3)
present and potential Hazards; (4) Access via primary
routes for approach and evacuation, and the location
of the Incident Command Point; (5) the estimated Num-
ber (few, tens, hundreds) and severity of casualties; and
(6) Extra resources needed [6,25,32,34]. These crucial
pieces of information may be recalled by the mnemonic
“ETHANE”. “METHANE” may also be used, where the “M”
denotes declaring a “Major incident”, but doing so and
activating disaster plans is not always an authority given
to prehospital personnel [26].
3.4.1. Overviewing Scene Layout & Interpreting
Environmental Indicators
Layout of the scene has been an observed complicating factor
lengthening the time between the emergency call to comple-
tion of the evacuation [2,23]. Making a first assessment and
establishing control is more difficult if the scene is divided
into natural sections that are difficult to overview, such as a
railway platform [30] or involving large structures like buses
or trains [2]. Such situations have been managed by adding
to the chain of command, where arriving units are assigned
geographic zones and may report to a specific commander
for the area or directly to the medic in change [32,34,70].
In Israel, the number of “lying wounded” is used as
a surrogate for seriously injured casualties [34], but sev-
eral environmental indicators may be used to estimate the
number of casualties at the scene of a bombing. Simply
identifying the place and size of the affected area together
with the time of day or week, one may be able to estimate
the demographics and numbers of casualties expected [15].
With regard to attacks targeting buses and trains, in terms
of estimating number of casualties, it is important to con-
sider the risk of ejection from the vehicle and entrapment
under it [74] as there have been examples of such bomb-
ings causing some of the passengers to be ejected up to
100 meters [37].
Frykberg defined several prognostic factors affecting
casualty outcome of bombings, which can be observed or
estimated during the initial assessment of the scene: mag-
nitude of explosion, urban versus isolated setting, closed
space versus open-air setting of bombing, and building col-
lapse [9]. The type of bomb has different repercussions in
terms of scale of destruction and likelihood of producing
mass casualties. The size of the zone at risk is dependent
on the type and amount of explosives, the environment, and
the size of debris. Explosives hidden in a backpack are
capable of producing mass casualties and causing build-
ing collapse, despite being limited in size. A car bomb,
again depending on explosive type and quantity, is capable
of causing destruction over a 500 m radius and may be
detonated remotely or driven close to a target [75]. If the
explosives are carried on their person, the destructive force
of a suicide bomber also limits the amount of explosives
that can be used [20], but the destructive force is often
amplified by the use of high-grade explosives, a load of
heavy shrapnel, and the additional ability of the attackers to
detonate the explosive device in proximity to victims [73].
Many of the reviewed articles involve the effect of the
setting on mortality and injuries of casualties in an indoor
versus an open-air setting. There is some debate about
what to call these settings, but the bottom line is that the
more confined the space, the higher the rates of mortality
[6]. Open-air (OA) bombings, e.g. in outdoor cafe´s or bus
stops, result in fewer casualties than those detonating in
a confined-space (CS) setting, in addition to having lower
immediate, and late, mortality rates [16,76,77]. Casualties
of OA bombings, however, show higher rates of penetrating
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soft tissue injury due to shrapnel, which are mostly minor
and can often be treated and released [78]. While Leibovici
et al. [79] classified bus bombings as confined-space bomb-
ings, Kosashvili et al. [16] stated that bus bombings should
be further distinguished from other CS settings, such as
restaurants and nightclubs. Instead, buses ought to be
considered an ultra-confined space (UCS), because buses
constitute a smaller confined space, leading more people to
be closer to the explosion center. Furthermore, the people
in the immediate vicinity of the explosion are not the only
ones in danger: the more distant passengers will also be
at risk of injury due to rebound amplification of the blast
wave as it is reflected [16,80]. In Kosashvili et al.’s study of
12 consecutive suicide bombings, the bus settings led to
higher rates of overall mortality compared to CS bombings
in buildings and OA bombings, but smaller rates of moder-
ate and severe injuries as more individuals were exposed
to lethal pressure from the blast wave. Meanwhile, lower im-
mediate mortality rates (16.9%) were seen in CS bombings,
compared to buses (21.2%), but higher rates of moderate
and severe injuries, often involving multiple systems and
requiring urgent surgical treatment. Almogy et al. [73] also
found a difference in severity of injury between the three
settings; a median number of 11, 8, and 5 casualties were
in need of hospital admittance after bus, CS, and OA bomb-
ings, respectively. One may extrapolate that vehicles, such
as trains and airplanes on the ground, will be similar to a
bus setting, while subway trains in tunnels constitute an
even more extreme setting, as they are doubly contained.
In a comparison of the four scenes of the London bombings
in 2005, mortality was highest and amputations were most
numerous at the scene where the explosion took place in
a carriage in a single tunnel [80]. The highest immediate
mortality rates from bombing settings have been seen in
bombings that resulted in structural collapse, and people
located in a collapsed region of buildings have been signif-
icantly more likely to die or require hospitalization [73,81].
In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 45% of those who
perished were in the building that collapsed [61].
3.4.2. Understanding Setting Driven Needs for Specialist
Skills & Resources
The scene of an attack often entails difficult working condi-
tions, sometimes compounded by a public transportation
target that adds hazards and challenges on scene, necessi-
tating specialist training, extrication skills, and equipment
for an efficient rescue [43,44,52,60]. Otherwise, surround-
ing hazards can delay both EMS access to victims and
evacuation, in turn affecting mortality since the probability
of saving critically injured victims greatly decreases with
time [5,46,74]. In connection to public transportation, haz-
ards are fuel ignition, electrical current, and surrounding
traffic; issues which need to be dealt with before rescue
is started [30,39,52]. Incidents in underground locations
often entail difficult working conditions; for example, poor
ventilation means airborne dust, smoke and high temper-
atures, lack of lighting means working by flashlight, and
access to debris-filled carriages requires use of ladders
[44,60,69]. Vehicle stabilization may be required before
work in train carriages or buses is initiated [52], and the
dynamic risk assessment needs to include re-evaluation of
stability and other safety issues as responders, casualties,
and equipment move around the vehicle during extrication
procedures [43,52]. Noise caused by a large number of
rescue workers can also reduce possibilities of hearing
buried victims in incidents which have amounted to building
collapse. Quickly cordoning off such sites and limiting per-
sonnel could thus increase likelihood of finding victims in
the debris [82]. Attacks occurring at sea present special pre-
hospital challenges when rescue is additionally complicated
by the vessel structure, number of passengers, isolation,
distance, and limited evacuation means [35]. Such inci-
dents may also entail environmental hazards during rescue,
e.g. water current, underwater obstacles, and rapid tem-
perature loss, so personnel entering the water ought to be
trained and equipped [52]. Other hazards during scene
management have included hot ground temperatures, high
debris piles and falling debris, smoke, dust, stored gases,
liquids, and ammunition [39,45,47,48,71,83]. Geographic
information systems (GIS) have proved essential to manag-
ing hazards by illustrating security and safety zones, build-
ing damage, and disposition of relief assets, presenting
possibilities for the future where GIS professionals may
serve as “information first responders” [48].
3.5. Triage and Treatment
While “triage” and “treatment” are divided in MIMMS, here
they are presented together as the issues are closely inter-
related in the management of injuries on scene.
3.5.1. Differing Triage Systems & Labeling
The goal of field triage is to identify that minority of criti-
cally injured (salvageable) casualties who need immediate
care, provide them with lifesaving procedures, and assign
the casualty priority for further treatment [18,32,50,84] and
transport, accounting for the casualties’ need for treatment
at a hospital as well as considering hospital capability and
capacity [18,32,84]. In order to denote the different triage
categories, numbers, colors, or symbols may be used [18]
on tags [50] or tape [16] attached to the casualty. They
could also be directly drawn on with permanent marker [85].
There are several different triage systems used, with two to
five categories [20] utilized to mark the condition of the ca-
sualty and/or priority for medical evacuation. For large-scale
responses, which may require action by several EMS orga-
nizations, standardization of triage systems is important. It
is not only considering choice of triage system that is impor-
tant but also addressing what should be the foundation and
indicator for the labeling to avoid being left up to the interpre-
tation of each responder [30,35]. Many previous incidents
have shown the use of a planned or improvised, simplified,
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two-category triage, dividing casualties into an “urgent” or
“non-urgent” group [8,35,46,70,72,86,87]. While triage into
more categories is likely suitable at the ED, there may be a
reason to evaluate whether a wider use of a simplified triage
for MCAs is appropriate in the prehospital setting [8].
3.5.2. Directing & Gathering Casualties
The assigned triage categories are divided into triage sites
established in searched, cleared, and secured areas away
from the scene, where surviving casualties and medical per-
sonnel are protected from further hostilities [9,14,34]. The
great majority of injuries suffered by immediate survivors
of bombings are mostly non-life-threatening, resulting in
“walking wounded” people who can be temporarily gathered,
observed, and treated in a designated area together with
other non-urgent casualties, while being given and supply-
ing information [32,34,88]. While the duration of a suitable
observation period may be under question with regard to
bombings, one study showed that all cases of pulmonary
primary blast injury developed within 1 hour [15]. A high
incidence of anxiety and other-stress related phenomena
often follow bombing incidents, which implies that many
mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation.
As an emotionally traumatized person may require both
medical and psychosocial support for years, substantial
treatment of non-urgent casualties also constitutes a part
of a good initial response [89]. Achieving early site control
and informing walking-wounded individuals where to go for
assistance constitutes an important measure for their safety
and keeps them from independently deciding where to go,
resorting to “self-evacuation” [15,20,47]. As complete use
of EMS for evacuation has been rare [42,47,90], pre-event
plans should consider self-evacuation inevitable and have
procedures to manage it, e.g., by preparing a separated
area of treatment of mildly injured people close to the ED at
the nearest hospital or by treating and releasing casualties
with minor injuries gathered at the scene, or sending them
to more distant hospitals, to avoid overwhelming proximal
facilities [32,86,89,91]. Directing non-urgent casualties to a
separate triage area allows most of the EMS work on scene
to focus on those with more urgent injuries [20,34].
3.5.3. Encountering Uncommon Injuries
Different types of attacks obviously result in very diverse
patterns of injury and medical needs, but the focus of this
study has mainly examined research related to bombings.
Previous armed assaults however, have shown that gunshot
victims have a higher propensity for moderate injuries com-
pared to blast victims, as well as slightly higher inpatient
mortality, which creates critical need for immediate resusci-
tation [92]. Shootings therefore create great demands on
prehospital care and rapid evacuation in order to decrease
mortality of the critically injured [29,56]. While identification
of gunshot injuries can be more straightforward [87], deto-
nation injuries may be problematic to diagnose and treat,
and are uncommon in most civilian settings [6,10,11,15].
Bombings, however, constitute the most common way to
perpetrate terrorist attacks [75], which is why some aspects
relevant for triage and treatment of blast injuries in the pre-
hospital stage will be presented more in depth.
A characteristic injury pattern of bomb explosions is one
of a complex but often non-lethal nature, where most casu-
alties do not require hospitalization as only a small number
have severe injuries [9,32,39,55,62,75,82,90,93–96]. The
vast majority of deaths from bombings usually take place
at the scene or en route to the hospital, followed by few
early and occasional late deaths [17,58,62,97]. In a study
of 33 MCAs, Einav and colleagues [96] found that roughly
a fifth (n = 236; 20.4%) of the injured were considered ur-
gent casualties. Consequently, a large majority of surviving
victims can likely be triaged and treated on an outpatient
basis [17,97]. Medical preparedness should anticipate most
injuries from bombings to be nonfatal secondary and ter-
tiary blast injuries [9,10,44,81,97]. Personnel responding to
the scene of a high-explosive detonation will be confronted
mostly with injuries comprising conventional blunt, pene-
trating, and thermal trauma, but they need to be wary of
the less common, potentially life-threatening primary blast
injuries, which may present subtly or delayed [15]. Even
with no detectable external trauma, there is a risk of pri-
mary blast injuries, e.g. to the lungs or bowels. This needs
to be considered, especially in casualties categorized as
non-urgent [12,34,79,82,97,98].
Trauma after explosions is often divided into primary,
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary injuries [9,15,84]. Pri-
mary blast injury (PBI) occurs as a direct effect of changes
in atmospheric pressure caused by a blast wave, mainly
injuring gas-containing organ systems, notably the middle
ear, the lungs, and the bowel [15]. Blast lung injury (BLI)
is not the most common injury, but it causes the greatest
morbidity and late mortality from blast effect and may be
complicated by pneumothoraces or hemothoraces [47,99].
Early recognition of BLI may improve outcome by directing
patients to an appropriate level of care and initiating early
treatment [77]. Clinical signs and symptoms of BLI include
dyspnea, chest pain, hemoptysis, hypoxia, and/or wheezing
[47]. Abdominal blast injuries are rare, but if the casualty
displays clinical signs such as nausea, vomiting, or abdomi-
nal pain, they need to be aggressively treated, with serial
abdominal examinations and nothing given by mouth [9,47].
A long-cherished belief among rescuers has been the
examination of the tympanic membrane to quickly triage
victims for other primary blast injuries [100], but several
studies [13,76,101] have shown that tympanic membrane
rupture (TMR) is neither a reliable predictor of other PBI,
nor a reliable method of diagnosis. Presence of a perforated
eardrum may indicate exposure to significant overpressure,
warranting evaluation; however, the absence of eardrum
rupture does not exclude the person from being at risk of
other PBI [13,14,99,101]. A study of 647 terrorist bombing
survivors showed that all casualties with BLIs had a fully
developed clinical picture in the first hour after admission
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and that intestinal blast injury were rare and typically as-
sociated with other severe injuries [13]. Secondary blast
injuries (SBI) occur when objects accelerated by the energy
of the explosion strike a victim, often causing the most nu-
merous injuries from blunt or penetrating ballistic trauma
[14,15,17]. Tertiary blast injuries (TBI) can be viewed as
the converse of SBI; the missile is stationary and the victim
is propelled by expanding gases from high winds, result-
ing in a high incidence of blunt trauma from tumbling and
impacting objects [15,98]. Quaternary injuries often imply
injuries due to delayed causes such as crush injuries from
building collapse or inhalation and burns from secondary
fires [27,47,75,78]. Due to several injury mechanisms, ex-
plosions can cause a multiplicity and variety of injuries to
several regions of the body in a single individual, referred
to as a multi-dimensional injury [68,82,84,91,102].
The anatomic site and nature of injury constitute some
important prognostic factors among bombing victims [9].
Traumatic amputation of limbs caused by bomb blast car-
ries a high mortality and thus has often been seen as an
indication of fatality [37,80]. However, in the 2005 London
bombings, nearly one-fourth (24.5%) of those with traumatic
amputations survived [80]. Thus, it has been held that blast
injuries associated with late death such as primary limb
amputation, open-long bone fractures, abdominal injuries,
chest injuries, and blast lung injury, should instead be given
priority in triage [9,97]. During the chaotic circumstances af-
ter an attack, it may be difficult for EMS to determine levels
of consciousness and signs of life such as pulse and blood
pressure. Almogy et al. [77] therefore proposed some eas-
ily recognizable external signs of trauma after bombings, to
ease triage of BLI and to help EMS distinguish salvageable
from non-salvageable casualties. From their study of 15
suicide bombings, they found that patients with skull frac-
tures, burns covering more than 10% of the body surface
area (BSA), and penetrating wounds to the head and torso,
were more likely to suffer from BLI and require advanced
trauma care. The presence of amputations, open fractures,
and burns (covering more than 30% of BSA) was signifi-
cantly higher in fatally injured people. If combined with no
sign of life, these should be categorized as “unsalvageable”,
according to Almogy et al. [77]. Almogy et al. later showed
that casualties with penetrating head injuries and those with
more than 4 body areas injured were significantly more
likely to suffer from BLI. As for intra-abdominal injuries, they
were more likely in casualties with penetrating torso injuries
and those with more than 4 body areas injured. Based on
this, they moved to simplify EMS triage further by focusing
on vital signs and the number of regions injured, where
more than 4 injured body regions implied transfer to a Level
I trauma center [103].
3.5.4. Setting up Field Hospitals & Personnel Matters
There are two main approaches to providing prehospital
care to trauma victims: Basic Life Support (BLS) treatment
and rapid evacuation techniques (formerly referred to as
“Scoop and Run”); and Advanced Life Support (ALS) on
scene, prior to transport (formerly referred to as “Stay and
Play”) [104]. The choice of whether to give advanced treat-
ment on site and establish collections points versus quickly
transferring patients to hospitals is based on the prevailing
conditions, mostly affected by proximity to hospitals and
the availability of transportation. Generally, this means that
the ALS is recommended in rural areas while the BLS is
executed in urban areas [7]. It has repeatedly been ob-
served that by the time medical staff from the hospitals are
at their highest number at the scene and assembly points
have been established, the most seriously injured have al-
ready been transported to the hospitals [66]. According to
Kluger [84], definitive care by well-trained physicians in well-
equipped facilities has a higher impact on patient outcome
than care on scene. Setting up field hospitals and sending
mobile teams from hospitals to provide advanced treatment
on scene is an alternative when there is not enough prehos-
pital staff, when casualties are trapped, when appropriate
hospitals are far away, or where limited transport facilities
cause a delay in evacuation [53,68,82,105]. There have
also been instances were physicians have been beneficial
on the scene by enabling extrication and transfer to hospital,
sometimes through field amputations [55,58,61]. Mostly
though, researchers [31,55,57] have concluded that physi-
cians and nurses are not suitable for incident sites if they are
untrained and unprepared to work in a suboptimal and dan-
gerous prehospital environment because the risk to them
is big, while the benefits are small. To provide meaningful
assistance at the scene, personnel ought to be trained, or-
ganized, and have clear assignments in order to understand
the workings of emergency services and be familiar with the
pre-hospital environment [41,44,46,60]. The expertise of
physicians and nurses may be of better use at the hospital,
as individuals perform best when executing an extension
of their normal work, where facilities and equipment are
familiar [38,57,87]. The importance of training prehospital
responders in the specifics of antagonistic attacks and gen-
eral MCI management has also been highlighted to assure
that they work with adapted procedures for mass casualties
and have knowledge in management of blast injuries [53].
Several incidents have amounted to large groups of
self-deployed medically trained “freelancers” and other vol-
unteers; people approaching the scene or hospitals on their
own initiative [39,44,46,48,55,62,83,106]. This has some-
times been discouraged and at other times encouraged,
highlighting the importance of incorporating bystander re-
sponse in response plans and training [20,29,57]. In Israel,
educated and trained lay bystanders are considered front-
line first responders and constitute a cornerstone in the
defense measures against terrorism [20]. While meaning
well, several examples exist where aid provided by volun-
teers has not been helpful [46,49,50,55]. Other accounts
however, highlight beneficial actions, such as application of
improvised tourniquets, carrying of stretchers, work at for-
malized triage and treatment stations in safe areas, and pro-
vision of evacuation of injured [27,32,43,49,50,53,61,71].
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3.5.5. Determining Ambition for Level of Care & Treatment
Treatment on site is best when focused on life-saving pro-
cedures while enabling evacuation [34]; Frykberg [9] con-
cluded that a short interval between injury and treatment,
and early aggressive resuscitation, constitute a prognostic
factor for survival. It is imperative that medical staff check
their instincts to deliver as much care as needed to each
victim while in a mass casualty setting [32,49]. Instead,
triage and treatment in MCAs often necessitate a battlefield
mentality, using damage-control principles where minimally
required care is provided to the maximum number of injured-
with consideration to available resources and personnel, on
scene, and in receiving institutions [6,8]. Field personnel
are challenged with identifying salvageable casualties in or-
der to treat them sufficiently so that they reach the hospital
alive [6,32,37].
According to TCCC guidelines, control of external hemor-
rhage is placed ahead of airway control, exchanging the
traditional ABC mnemonic (for airway, breathing, circula-
tion) with MARCH: Massive Hemorrhage Control/Airway Sup-
port/Respiratory Threats/Circulation/Hypothermia [29]. How-
ever, the extent of treatment, and what procedures should be
carried out in the area of explosion or shooting, is incongruent
or unclearly described in the included studies. Some hold
that external hemorrhage control should be the only proce-
dure conducted before casualties are taken to a designated
safe zone [5,70]. Others, hold that initial on-scene treatment
should follow fundamental resuscitation protocols including
spinal immobilization (c-spine), opening of obstructed airway
(chin-lift maneuver), and control of breathing, while all other
treatments are deferred to the next survey [32,34,47]. The
main thing is that a minimum of emergency forces provide a
minimum of procedures on an unsecure site, holding off the
majority of staff and treatment on scene at established safe
areas. With regard to field medical care, Stein and Hirshberg
[99] concluded that airway with C-spine had probably saved
the most salvageable casualties after terrorist explosions.
Oxygenation may be monitored using pulse oximetry and, if
necessary, improved by oxygen via mask and a rebreathing
reservoir [47,99]. Needle insertion to relieve pneumothoraces
may also be prudent [37,47,99], and tracheal intubation may
be performed if the patient’s pulmonary status deteriorates
[34,47]. Treatment of air embolism is supported by placing
the casualty in the Trendelenburg and left-lateral-decubitus
position [47]. Alignment and stabilization of fractures is an-
other important treatment in the field. Covering open wounds,
where possible, is also helpful/desirable [47,99]. Limbs that
have experienced crush injuries may need to be splinted, and
at an early stage severe crush injuries may be treated with
IV fluids to help minimize the complications from rhabdomy-
olysis [47]. One important cause of coagulopathy in trauma
patients is hypothermia, the risk for which may be reduced
by covering wounds [34] and generally protecting casualties
from the elements. Burns ought to be covered with a clean
dressing, and IV fluids should be started for burns covering
large BSA [47]. The Modified Brooke formula may be better
for the management of burns as the use of Parklands formula,
in addition to overestimation of burnt BSA, can cause over-
resuscitation [71]. The air-medical evacuation of bombing
casualties from Bali to Australia demonstrated the risk of grad-
ual deterioration in casualties with burns, threatening limbs
which were previously well perfused which underlines the
need for continuous assessment [85]. If amputations have
occurred, the patient’s limb should be covered, hemorrhage
controlled and the amputated body part salvaged, covered,
and transported to the hospital with the patient. Completion
of partial amputations is not advised when in the field [47].
While use of tourniquets in military trauma is well estab-
lished, their use in civilian practice has been more contro-
versial [34,80,107]. While some accentuate the time-critical
situation for casualties with exsanguinating hemorrhage [29],
others hold that in the case of terrorist bombings these usu-
ally occur in urban settings with short evacuation times where
plenty of volunteers are available to apply direct pressure [34].
However, providing speedy application of tourniquet to control
bleeding in hemorrhaging casualties is encouraged in several
articles to improve survival in MCAs [5,29,56]. In a civilian
prehospital response, recommended interventions to severe
bleedings thus include application of tourniquet to control ex-
tremity hemorrhage, hemostatic dressings to control bleeding
from sites not amenable to a tourniquet, and “Sit up and lean
forward” posture for casualties with direct maxillofacial trauma
(which can result in either airway obstruction or bleeding into
the airway) [29]. Support for tourniquet use was indicted in
a study from the response to the 2005 London bombings
as all the patients with amputations, except one, who were
admitted to the Royal London Hospital, with makeshift tourni-
quets, survived their injuries while the one with no tourniquet
did not [80]. Risks with improvised tourniquets however, also
have been seen, e.g. after the Boston Marathon bombing.
Several of the improvised tourniquets proved to be venous
tourniquets, non-hemostatic and with paradoxical bleeding
upon ED arrival [107]. In order to avoid unnecessary compli-
cations, a tourniquet should be able to “completely occlude
arterial blood flow, have ease and speed of application under
tactical situations and in the dark, be removable, portable,
durable, inexpensive and cause minimal tissue necrosis and
pain” [34]. Ideally, the tourniquet should be removed as soon
as possible after application [34], meaning that it is important
to document time of application. Direct pressure can also
be used to control bleeding from external bleeding sites by
applying consistent and significant pressure to the packed
wound, with the injured person placed on a firm surface. In
severe bleedings, direct pressure must be sustained until the
person reaches the operating room [29], a procedure which
may not be feasible in an MCA setting [34].
3.5.6. Providing Psychological Support
While this review is not focused on long-term psycholog-
ical effects of terrorist attacks, some aspects relevant for
on-scene care will confer terrorism as a “perfect traumatic
stressor combining elements of malevolent intent, actual or
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threatened extreme harm, and unending fear of the future”
[108]. Despite this, most people will recover without signifi-
cant psychiatric sequelae although transient symptoms of
stress are common after experiences of mass violence [36].
Early mental health assessment and intervention does not
focus on providing “psychological forms of treatment” but
rather down-to-earth and practical provision of basic ser-
vices [36,88]. After large-scale trauma most psychological
care is physical and includes establishing safety, providing
food, shelter and medical assistance, mental health triage,
and orientation with local services and information [36,88].
Psychological first aid also entails reducing psychological
arousal, mobilizing support for those most distressed, keep-
ing families together, and facilitating reunions with loved
ones [36]. Providing information about community services,
that the victim can access later, and describing upcoming
steps in the criminal investigation and legal proceeding is
also important [109]. Once mass terror survivors feel they
are out of immediate danger and their basic needs have
been met, they usually want answers; a shortage of ac-
curate information is potentially traumatic and harmful if
wild rumors result in panic or deprivation of services [88].
Response to a terrorist attack also requires a practical task
of the responder: to obtain information from the victim in
order to maximize the possibility of apprehending the perpe-
trator(s), prevent further violence, and plan for aiding other
potential victims [88]. Responders are in a unique posi-
tion to help victims deal with the impact of their ordeal by
helping them restore a sense of safety and control, e.g. by
providing a safe and quiet location in which they can treat
and interview them [109]. Collaborating with mental health
clinicians may be useful in such situations to help balance
concerns for victim welfare and the need to obtain detailed
information. Integrating them into responses to MCAs could
therefore prove wise during pre-event planning [36,88]. It
has been indicated that people who can contribute to the
rescue in some way manage better as they do not feel
helpless, they gain a measure of control [36]. Exemplified
“buddy aid” approaches in some responses, where those
triaged with minor injuries are encouraged to assist [50],
may be one way to achieve this. In the case of bombings,
it should be noted that victims suffering from primary blast
injuries may fare poorly by strenuous physical activities,
EMS personnel therefore need to reduce the activity level of
potential blast-exposed individuals [15]. Planning has been
highlighted as an area of response in need of improvement,
in relation to psychological assistance [7,30,110]. Lacking
command and coordination of the mental health responder
group has led some receivers of aid to experience being
“killed with kindness”; they are overwhelmed with offers of
support and services [67].
3.5.7. Caring for the Pediatric Casualty
In addition to EMS personnel worldwide being less experi-
enced, in dealing with emergency management of critically
ill children compared to adults, pediatric victims of terrorist
attacks suffer injuries not usually seen in the age group [19].
Waisman et al. [18] describe an experience-based devel-
opment of a pediatric triage algorithm with changes to the
performance of triage in children due to the difficulties and
time-consuming practice, of obtaining measurements of vital
signs and blood pressure in children, and due to different
mechanisms of injury in children because of their physiologi-
cal and anatomical characteristics. For further details please
see original references [18,19]. Since children have unique
characteristics and pediatric mass-casualty incidents are rare,
prehospital personnel may have difficulties performing certain
clinical procedures such as intubation or establishing an in-
travenous line. It has therefore been recommended that only
simple life-saving procedures such as opening an airway or
maintaining ventilation should be performed for children at
the scene of an MCA. Other procedures should be postponed
until the child’s arrival to the ED. Optimally, children should be
evacuated to a hospital with pediatric capabilities, but if they
have critical injuries they may need to be stabilized at the
nearest hospital first. If possible, it is also advisable that EMS
staff find a familiar adult to keep the child company to the
hospital during such a stressful event, but not if it results in
significant delay in patient evacuation [19]. Emotional trauma,
e.g., due to separation from parents, is a critical factor during
pediatric care, which implies that it is vital to identify children
assigned to the “delayed care” category with anxiety and
acute emotional stress and provide them with psychosocial
support [18]. Letting children help with small maneuvers, like
undressing to allow examination, may be helpful for restoring
their sense of control in an otherwise disorienting situation
[88]. If the weather is cold or if children have to be undressed
for decontamination or triage, responders have to consider
that they are more susceptible to hypothermia [18].
3.6. Transport
Three major types of challenges to evacuation were exem-
plified in the articles reviewed, most of which coincide with
unintentional mass-casualty incidents.
3.6.1. Accessing & Leaving the Scene
Maintaining clearly identified, physical pathways for entry
and exit from the scene is essential in order to ensure rapid
and appropriate evacuation, as well as coordinated and
controlled access [2,20]. Blockades by debris, underground
location, or access through narrow streets have repeatedly
made access difficult, resulting in dispersion of casualties
to multiple collection points and prolonged evacuation time
[2,28,30,33,60]. Multiple access or unclear designation
routes have caused problems, not just for evacuation but
also initial command, communication, and cooperation be-
tween units [2,30]. Multiple exit points for those wounded
of varying severity and lack of coordination among the res-
cue teams have also led medical teams to miss groups of
casualties, delaying their care [2].
Road congestion has made it difficult to get both to and
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from the scene [39,64], occasionally exacerbated by rescue
service, security, or police forces blocking entrance of EMS
to the scene [2,33,59] and other times alleviated through
police establishment of designated evacuation routes to
the hospitals [32,46,63,68]. Targeting public transportation
infrastructure, like subways and buses, can aggravate ob-
structions to medical evacuation, preventing medical staff
from reaching their post and discharged patients from clear-
ing the hospital [60,111]. Ways to adapt to road congestion
include pre-planned deployment of paramedics on bicycles;
using helicopters to move doctors, equipment, and casual-
ties; and sending nurses onto main roads to triage people
seeking medical care [60,63,69].
The topographical location has been known to create
access difficulties both for road-bound vehicles and heli-
copters [70]. Such accessibility difficulties may result in in-
efficient convergence of ambulances on the incident scene,
forcing them to wait in queue at a distance from the scene
[112], and creating a more physically taxing rescue effort.
Use of all-terrain vehicles have been beneficial for trans-
portation in cumbersome terrain [50].
3.6.2. Evacuating from Urban or Rural Scenes
A determinant of mortality among victims of antagonistic
attacks is the availability of medical resources at the scene
and the prehospital system of transport and care. Longer
times for rescue and transport to definitive care, from iso-
lated areas, tends to result in higher mortality rates [9]. The
distance to definitive care and available means of trans-
portation, from urban or rural incident scenes, require differ-
ent approaches in terms of the degree of prehospital care
on site versus transfer and care at an appropriate medical
facility. Pinkert et al. [95] concluded, that when an MCA
affects an urban area, in the vicinity of several hospitals,
the best course of action involved rapid arrival of a large
number of ambulances, rapid primary triage, use of evacu-
ation priorities, and rapid distribution of casualties among
all nearby hospitals in the area. Such a response requires
synchronization of the EMS response and appropriate dis-
tribution of casualties to hospitals [64,95]. As most attacks
occur in an urban setting [34], rapid evacuation will be suit-
able in most cases, but when attacks occur in rural areas,
there may be limited EMS and small, local hospitals with
fewer resources, and limited abilities to cope with a large
number of injured people [106]. Such responses may re-
quire the use of other modes of transportation for medical
evacuation, transfer of staff and equipment, higher degrees
of treatment on site, or use of local hospitals as casualty
collection points, dependent on their capabilities.
Helicopters and fixed-wing aircrafts have been essen-
tial to deploy staff and equipment to the site or primary
receiving hospitals [44,93,105,112], as well as use for pri-
mary or secondary evacuation and distribution of injured
[93,105,112]. Improvements in air evacuation have signifi-
cantly upgraded the ability of the EMS to rapidly evacuate
MCA casualties in distant areas to tertiary care facilities,
but effective use of air-medical evacuation requires plan-
ning, coordination, and training [112]. It is also a mode of
transportation sensitive to the weather conditions, thus not
necessarily serviceable when needed [92]. Coordination of
helicopters have been challenging due to poor weather con-
ditions, uncontrolled airspace, unsettled safety settings, and
unsuitable placement of casualty clearing stations [41]. To
facilitate air-medical evacuation, incident command ought
to gather and transmit information regarding landing zone
characteristics and severity of injuries prior to reaching the
site, possibly by assigning an Air Support Manager [112].
While air-medical evacuation can be a suitable option for
incidents at sea, it may also entail difficulties depending on
the vessel’s size: there is not always space to land and the
use of a rescue hoist is time consuming. Winds from rotors
risk blowing away equipment not lashed, impacting the care
of those on scene [35]. Some medically challenging condi-
tions and treatments described in connection to air-medical
evacuation of blast and burn casualties include underappre-
ciated hypoxemia; unrecognized pneumothorax or arterial
air-embolism [15]; stabilizing fractures, [102]; maintaining
normothermia [20,27] and providing correct amounts of fluid
replacement to avoid swelling of the airway [27].
3.6.3. Distributing Casualties
Like other mass-casualty incidents, distribution of casual-
ties to appropriate health care facilities is one of the most
important issues after MCAs [104], as bed availability, capa-
bility to manage specific injuries, and potential for casualty
transfer is vital to ensure good patient care [4]. Distribution
of casualties however, has been problematic after several
MCAs [2,17,28,64]. Optimal distribution of casualties is
hinged upon well-established local command and commu-
nications with the receiving hospitals, facilitated through
preparation [6]. From two MCAs, Rodoplu et al. [17,28]
found that maldistribution seemed associated with distance
from the scene, type of medical facility, personal preference
of survivors, lack of central coordination of ambulances, and
lack of field triage.
A common issue after urban MCAs has been the hospi-
tal nearest to the site becoming overwhelmed [20,30,58,94].
This is largely due to the common phenomena known
as self-evacuation or self-triage, where people with mi-
nor injuries make their own way to the hospital [29,59,84],
aided by non-medical vehicles [27,30,61,65,66,72,86,94,
113]. This results in an early arrival pattern of mild ca-
sualties who can be treated and released, while ambu-
lances carrying the more severely injured and casualties
requiring extrication arrive later [15,32,43,62,86,94]. Sim-
ilar patterns may also arise if minor injured people are
assembled and transferred to the hospital by bus, as this
can be achieved more quickly than the medical evacua-
tion of more severely injured people [64]. If evacuation of
minor injured people is controlled, it is more suitable to
evacuate them to a more distant hospital, and if arrival of
patients is not controlled and the hospital is overwhelmed,
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it may be necessary for it to function as a casualty col-
lection point, triaging between high-acuity and low-acuity
casualties, and secondarily transporting some to more dis-
tant facilities [47,111]. Despite the pattern of the closest
hospital often being overwhelmed, recommendations and
practice from several incidents have been to evacuate all
patients with immediate, life-threatening injuries to the clos-
est hospital for evaluation and stabilization [86,95,96,104].
Meanwhile, casualty-clearing stations may be used to treat
those with minor injuries on site [66], providing Advanced
Life Support (ALS) until they can be evacuated directly to a
suitable facility [104].
Another approach [86,106] is to evacuate all casualties
to the hospital closest to the site for advanced, hospital-
based resuscitation. The principle of an evacuation hospi-
tal (or “triage hospital”) has been recommended when the
needs of the patients greatly outweigh the capabilities of the
receiving hospital or when the expected number of patients
amount to a continued patient flow. This sets the hospital
to a mode of treating and discharging mild casualties while
stabilizing, and secondarily evacuating, patients that require
admission [93,105].
4. Concluding Discussion
In this review of 105 articles regarding response chal-
lenges on scene of a mass-casualty attack, difficulties
were found corresponding to each prioritized task, as
defined in the MIMMS framework. Two aspects of impor-
tance, not equally highlighted in the original framework,
were functional coordination and collaboration, as well as
the influence of the environment. While the former has
been noted in analysis of previous responses to uninten-
tional incidents, the significance of setting, noted during
scene assessment, is especially vital during bombings.
It is not only vital in estimating the number of direct fa-
talities and injured, but also as an indicator for possible
injuries and needs for equipment and specialist care.
Besides issues related to the “assessment task”, other
specific challenges in MCA management, compared to
unintentional incidents, were particularly clear in relation
to safety, triage, and treatment. Meanwhile, problems
related to command, coordination, and communication
were the most commonly reported, showing the overlap
in management of unintentional and intentional incidents.
Hence, experience in dealing with unintentional incidents
may prepare responders for challenges with command,
coordination, and communication, whereas specific chal-
lenges with safety, assessment, triage, and treatment
would remain foreign. Many of the included articles claim
that preparedness for MCAs thus require planning and
specific training [5,6,32,52,60,71,90,95,96,104]. It may
be inferred that if inter-organizational collaboration is to
be more offensive [5,29,56], these preparatory efforts
will be even more vital. In relation to preparatory efforts,
Vidali and Hutchens [114] stressed that fragmentation
between crisis management and public safety system
actors often constitute a hindrance to readiness measure-
ments and capability aggregation. They further highlight
the need to distinguish between capacity (quantifiable
assets such as equipment, vehicles and radios) and ca-
pability (qualitative measurements of e.g. skills, training
and coordination). If the resources are to be ready for
use, both aspects need to be accounted for, and failing to
do so could amount to poor investment decisions. Exam-
ples of such investment were observed by Lo´pez-Carresi
[30] after the Madrid bombings, where the Madrid-based
EMS decided to purchase more mobile telephones even
though scarcity of transmission equipment had not been
the cause of communication failures. Clearly, what is
needed to increase preparedness depends on the con-
text, but as Lo´pez-Carresi pointed out, there is often a
reluctance to make deep structural or system changes
(which may be interpreted as criticism of the current sys-
tem), as opposed to adjustments of the existing work
schemes (which may be seen as previous lack of funding
or other resources). Effectively increasing readiness for
MCAs will thus likely entail struggles to overcome frag-
mentation between the police, rescue service, EMS and
the broader crisis management system, as well as en-
abling critical and prestige-less assessments of needed
preparatory efforts.
Regarding the strength of evidence of the manage-
ment challenges, articles related to direct and indi-
rect threats to safety on scene, [54] and issues con-
cerning blast injuries with implications during assess-
ment, triage, and treatment had higher scientific quality
[10,11,78,80,101]. The scientific quality of the articles
varied, partly due to the difficulties of studying an issue
where circumstances and occurrence cannot be fore-
told or controlled (effecting study design). It was also
partly due to the limitations of this study- as a result of
the inclusion and exclusion criteria used to achieve the
study’s aim (effecting eligibility). If one were to search
more databases, or additionally include studies based on
simulations and relating to unintentional incidents, some
findings may have been made more robust. In order to
be feasible, one would have had to focus such a study
on a specific prioritized task on scene and/or the per-
spective of only one responder group. This study instead
lays the basis for such studies in the future and includes
valuable issues of consideration for personnel within the
EMS, police, and rescue service. The inclusion of ar-
ticles of lower scientific quality and the breadth of the
review may imply limitations for practical use. However,
it is not meant as a guideline for how incident manage-
ment should be conducted everywhere, since incident
response needs to be adapted to local incident manage-
ment systems, resources, and expectations. One cannot
simply cut and paste a system onto another; however,
reoccurring bottlenecks can be learned from other coun-
tries, and appropriate adjustments for dealing with such
issues can be made in accordance with the structure of
systems elsewhere [115].
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